The likelihood ratio (LR) is a probabilistic method that has been championed as a 'simple rule' for evaluating the value of forensic evidence in court. Intuitively, if the LR is greater than one then the evidence supports the prosecution hypothesis; if the LR is less than one it supports the defence hypothesis, and if the LR is equal to one then the evidence favours neither (and so is considered 'neutral' -having no probative value). It can be shown by Bayes' theorem that this simple relationship only applies to pairs of hypotheses for which one is the negation of the other (i.e. to mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses) and is not applicable otherwise. We show how easy it can be -even for evidence experts -to use pairs of hypotheses that they assume are mutually exclusive and exhaustive but are not, and hence to arrive at erroneous conclusions about the value of evidence using the LR. Furthermore, even when mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses are used there are extreme restrictions as to what can be concluded about a LR. Most importantly, while the distinction between source-level hypotheses (such as defendant was/was not at the crime scene) and offence-level hypotheses (defendant is/is not guilty) is well known, it is not widely understood that a LR for evidence about the former generally has no bearing on the LR of the latter. We show for the first time (using Bayesian networks) the full impact of this problem, and conclude that it is only the LR of the offence level hypotheses that genuinely determine the probabitive value of the evidence. We show how Bayesian networks can be used to do the necessary calculations. We investigate common scenarios in which evidence has a LR of one but still has significant probative value (i.e. is not neutral as is commonly assumed). As illustration we consider the ramifications of these points for the case of Barry George. The successful appeal against his conviction for the murder of Jill Dando was based primarily on the argument that the firearm discharge residue (FDR) evidence, assumed to support the prosecution hypothesis at the original trial, actually had an LR equal to one and hence was 'neutral'. However, our review of the appeal transcript shows numerous examples of the problems with the use of hypotheses identified above. We show that if one were to follow the arguments recorded in the Appeal judgment verbatim, then contrary to the Appeal conclusion, the probative value of the FDR evidence may not have been neutral as was concluded, but rather still supported the prosecution.
2

Introduction
One way to determine the probative value of any piece of evidence E (such as a footprint matching that of the defendant found at the crime scene) is to use the likelihood ratio (LR) [16] [3] . This is the probability of E given the prosecution hypothesis (e.g., 'defendant guilty') divided by the probability of E given the alternative, complementary defence hypothesis (e.g, 'defendant not guilty'). Increasingly, it is recommended as a 'simple rule' for evaluating forensic evidence in courts [11] [8] [19] [24] . Broader questions about how well the LR can capture the legal concept of relevance are discussed in [21] [22] [23] .
Because the LR involves probabilities -and ultimately some understanding of Bayes' theorem -its actual use in courts is often controversial, as can be seen from the RvT judgement [2] , which seemed to suggest that it should only be applicable to evidence (such as DNA) where the relevant probabilities are based on extensive databases of evidence. Numerous papers have critiqued the RvT judgement, highlighting its misunderstandings not just about the LR but about the about the role of probabilistic inference in the law generally [6] [19] [25] [27] . It is not the intention of this paper to revisit these arguments. In fact, for simplicity, we will assume that there is no disagreement about the specific probability values used in a given LR (the potential for such disagreement was the focus of the RvT debate and does not need to be repeated). Rather, we focus on a much more fundamental concern about the LR, namely the circumstances under which it actually provides correct information about the probative value of the evidence. We believe this is the first paper to identify the full set of concerns. This paper argues that there are many circumstances in which the real probative value of evidence may be very different from what can be concluded from the LR. This includes the fact that, contrary to received opinion, evidence with a LR equal to one can often still have significant probative value, i.e. is not neutral. This is because there are several subtleties to consider when interpreting LRs. Consideration of these subtleties requires careful, precise definitions of the hypotheses being evaluated. First, the LR method requires us to consider pairs of hypotheses that are both mutually exclusive and exhaustive, which means that exactly one of the hypotheses must be true. This point (together with the fact that we cannot sidestep the need to consider prior probabilities when considering the LR) has been well documented by others in the research community (see [20] [5] [10] [30] [18] ). However, in practice, these concerns do not seem to have been well understood, and we will show that even the most senior evidence experts have great difficulty in formulating relevant hypotheses that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Second, even when hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, , there is potential over the course of a case to confuse what in [9] were referred to as source-level hypotheses (such as blood at the scene belonging to or not belonging to the defendant) and offence-level hypotheses 2 (such as defendant being guilty or not guilty). Sometimes one may mutate into another through slight changes in the precision with which they are expressed. A LR for the source-level hypotheses will not in general be the same as for the offence-level hypotheses. Indeed, we will show it is possible that an LR that strongly favours one side for the source-level hypotheses can actually strongly favour the other side for the 3 offence-level hypotheses even though both pairs of hypotheses seem very similar. Similarly, an LR that is neutral under the source-level hypotheses may actually be significantly non-neutral under the associated offence-level hypotheses.
To illustrate the issues we raise, we use the Barry George Appeal judgment [1] in which the use of LR gained widespread attention because of it central role. We believe there are examples of many of the above problems in the transcript. Barry George had previously been convicted of the murder of TV celebrity Jill Dando. In the Appeal it was argued that the Firearm Discharge Residue (FDR) evidence, that had formed a key component of the prosecution case at the original trial, actually had a LR equal to one. The defence argued that this meant that the evidence was 'neutral' i.e. it had no probative value. The Judge duly quashed the original conviction as unsafe. Our critique of the Barry George appeal case is aimed towards the judgment transcript and not the actual expert testimonies during the trial. We have good reason to believe that careful testimonies may have been inaccurately presented in the appeal judgment. The extent of the confusion and mistaken reasoning present in the judgment document shows that these issues regarding the interpretation of the LR remain widely misunderstood.
In Section 2 we provide an overview of the role of likelihoods and the definiton of LR. We explain exactly what is meant by probative value of evidence and why the LR may be used to evaluate this. We also explain precisely what is meant by 'neutral' evidence. Our presentation clears up a number of widely held misunderstandings. In particular, we show why Bayes' theorem is critical and the use of prior probabilities for hypotheses cannot be side stepped (many texts assume that the LR can be understood without either Bayes' theorem or the consideration of priors). In Sections 3 and 4 we focus on the special case of evidence for which the LR is one and use example scenarios (and the help of Bayesian networks) to show how, in many circumstances, a LR of one does not ensure neutral evidence. Specifically, in Section 3, we show examples where the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In Section 4 we show that even when evidence has a LR of one for mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses (and thus really is neutral with respect to those hypotheses), the evidence still can have probative value (i.e., is not neutral) with regard to other relevant hypotheses, including the offence-level hypotheses of whether or not the defendant is guilty. Section 5 provides a thorough analysis of the Barry George appeal case judgment and shows how this document contains many examples of hypotheses used for the FDR evidence that were potentially not mutually exclusive and were not properly linked to the offence-level hypotheses. We demonstrate that if one were to follow the arguments recorded in the Appeal judgment verbatim, the probative value of the FDR evidence may not have been neutral (contrary to the Appeal conclusion) bur rather still supported the prosecution.
Some of what appears in Sections 2-4 is known to probability experts and a small number of forensic experts, but the ramifications do not appear to have been made explicit anywhere, nor have there been appropriate examples demonstrating the problems. This is the first paper to reveal the full extent of the problems, which we feel can only be properly captured and calculated using Bayesian networks [14] [29] . However, to ensure as wide a readership as possible most of the necessary calculations models are relegated to a set of Appendices.
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Likelihoods, the likelihood ratio and the probative value of evidence
Any legal trial seeks to determine whether one or more hypothesis is true or false. In the simplest case the prosecution has a single hypothesis H p (defendant guilty) and the defence has a single alternative hypothesis H d (defendant innocent). In this simplest case we assume that H d is the same as "not H p " (formally this means that H p and H d are mutually exclusive and exhaustive events).
Our belief in a hypothesis is expressed as a probability. The prior probability of a hypothesis H p , written P(H p ), is the probability of H p before we observe any evidence. When there are two mutually exclusive hypotheses H p and H d , the greater our belief in one, the less our belief in the other since P(H d ) = 1-P(H p ) by a basic axiom of probability. When we observe evidence E we revise our belief in H p (and similarly H d ). This revised probability is called the posterior probability of H p and is written P(H p | E) which means the 'probability of H p given E'. Bayes' theorem (see Appendix 1) provides a formula for computing this posterior probability. If the posterior probability is greater than the prior probability then it makes sense to say that the evidence E supports the hypothesis H p , because our belief in H p has increased after observing E. And if our belief in H p has increased then our belief in H d must have decreased since they are mutually exclusive explanations for the evidence, E. So, in such situations, it is both natural and correct to say that the evidence supports H p over H d . The bigger the increase the more the evidence E supports H p over H d .
Because many lawyers assume that prior probabilities are for jury members only (as they are 'personal and subjective') it is widely assumed that they should not be considered in court by forensic experts [14] ). Instead, a comparison of the probability of evidence E being found under both of the hypotheses is used to capture the probative value of evidence. Specifically, we compare  The probability of E assuming H p is true -this is written P(E | H p ) and is called the prosecution likelihood  The probability of E assuming H d is true -this is written P(E | H d ) and is called the defence likelihood 3 and calculate the likelihood ratio (LR), which is the prosecution likelihood divided by the defence likelihood.
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A simple example of how the LR describes the impact of evidence on hypotheses is shown in Appendix 1. We also prove in Appendix 1 that when prosecution and defence hypotheses are mutually exclusive, a LR of greater than one supports the 5 prosecution hypothesis and a LR of less than one supports the defence hypothesis. Hence, the LR has a simple interpretation for the probative value of the evidence under these assumptions.
It is argued that one of the most important benefits of the LR is that it forces experts to consider both the prosecution and defence likelihoods, and hence helps avoid wellknown problems associated with focusing on a single likelihood, such as interpreting a low defence likelihood as synonymous with a low probability of H d being true, or even worse committing the prosecutor's fallacy [14] .
The proof of the probative value of evidence in terms of the LR requires Bayes' theorem (see Appendix 1) . The normal way that textbooks 'prove' the simple LR rule is by comparing the prior odds of the prosecution hypothesis against the defence hypothesis with the posterior odds. This 'odds' approach (which is also explained in Appendix 1) is considered a 'simple rule' because it demands only that we consider relative probabilities of alternative hypotheses rather than additionally focus on the prior probabilities of one or other hypothesis. However, we believe that this rule is confusing, because not only does it hide the assumption that the hypotheses need to be mutually exclusive for it to to be correct, but it also fails to tell us clearly what we most need to know: namely that for the evidence E to 'support' the hypothesis H p it is necessary that the posterior probability of H p , i.e. P(H p | E) is greater than the prior probability P(H p ): in other words our belief in H p being true increases after we observe E.
There are also three crucial, points that must be noted about the use of the LR:
1. Although many proponents of the LR regard it is as a major benefit not to have to consider the prior probabilities, the LR actually tells us nothing about the probability that either hypothesis is true, no matter how high or low it is. We can only make conclusions about such (posterior) probabilities if we know the prior probabilities. This fact has been well documented by other researchers [17] . For example, suppose that for a pair of mutually exclusive hypotheses, the prior probability H p is 1/101 and the prior probability for H d is therefore 100/101. So the odds are 100 to 1 against the prosecution hypothesis. If a piece of evidence was found and evaluated to have a LR of 25 (strongly favouring the prosecution hypothesis) it follows from the odds form of Bayes that the correct posterior odds are 4 to 1 against the prosecution hypothesis, i.e the posterior probability of H p is 1/5 compared to posterior probability for H d of 4/5. In other words, despite the 'strong' piece of evidence E to support the prosecution hypothesis, the defence hypothesis is still more likely. The evidence is strong but nowhere near strong enough in this case.
2. When the assumption of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses is either wittingly or unwittingly undermined, the relationship between the LR of the evidence and the notion of 'probative value' of the evidence can change dramatically.
3. Even when the hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, the LR of the evidence may tell us nothing about its probative value on other superficially similar hypotheses. This is especially concerning if the source-level hypotheses (for which the evidence is neutral) are confused with offencelevel hypotheses (the defendant is innocent/guilty). Such concerns have been raised by other researchers in previous work [17] [10], but without any detailed elaboration.
It is the second and third points above that are the focus of this paper (addressed respectively in Sections 3 and 4). In particular, we consider the crucial special case when the LR is equal to one for evidence under a pair of prosecution and defence hypotheses. We will show that the evidence E may not be 'neutral' in these cases, i.e an LR equal to one does not, in fact, ensure that the evidence has no probative value.
As explained above, the correct way to define neutral evidence is in terms of the prior and posterior probabilities. Specifically, the evidence E is neutral for H p if the posterior is unchanged from the prior after observing the evidence, i. Section 4 focuses on those cases where the evidence might be genuinely neutral with respect to one pair of hypotheses but might not be neutral under other hypotheses that are also relevant to the case.
In Sections 3 and 4 we use the formalism of Bayesian networks both to model explicitly the causal relationships between hypotheses and evidence and also to automatically compute the necessary probability calculations. However, the models and calculations appear mainly in the Appendices.
3. The problems when hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive
Hypotheses that are not mutually exclusive
Here we provide an example showing why a LR of one does not ensure neutrality of evidence for non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. We also discuss how ill-defined hypotheses may be perceived to be mutually-exclusive, when they actually are not 4 The evidence E clearly supports both hypotheses, and it is quite conceivable that both P(E | H p ) and P(E | H d ) are equal. In Appendix 3 we provide the details of a situation in which both are equal to 0.9. So the LR equals one. The appendix also shows that P(H p | E) = P(H d | E) = 0.666 in this case. So the ratio of the posterior probabilities has remained the same as the ratio of the prior probabilities but the probability of both hypotheses have increased from 0.5 to 0.666. Because of the nature of the hypotheses, the fact that the probability of guilt has increased, even though the defence hypothesis has increased by a similar amount, means that the evidence E has genuine probative value despite its LR being equal to one. In this case we are not only more confident of guilt, but we are also more confident that the suspect was not at the crime scene. In other words, the increase in the probability of the defence hypothesis does not necessarily increase belief in innocence, but rather provides an explanation for guilt.
In the case where there is separate evidence E', such as a murder motive, to support H p the probative value of the supposedly 'neutral' evidence E can become even more dramatic as is shown in Appendix 3.
If readers feel that Example 1 is unsatisfactory because the likelihood values were 'plucked out of the air' then they should note that Appendix 4 (using a dice problem) provides an example demonstrating the same core point for likelihoods that are indisputable.
A further problem introduced by non-mutual exclusivity is that likelihoods are apt to be incorrectly reported. This is because the following probabilities are no longer all the same: 
Hypotheses exclusive but non-exhaustive
In this example evidence is evaluated against prosecution and defence hypotheses that are mutually exclusive (cannot both be true) but not exhaustive (i.e. neither may be true). The LR of the evidence is one for the prosecution and defence hypotheses considered, but it is certainly not neutral for the defence hypothesis.
Example 2:
Fred and Bill attempt to rob a man. When the man resists he is struck on the head and dies. During the long police investigation Bill dies while on remand so Fred is tried on his own for murder. Fred's defence is that it was Bill and not him who struck the blow to the head. Hence we have:
The problem here is that although these hypotheses are mutually exclusive they are not exhaustive since they fail to consider the possibility H a that the man did not actually die from the blow to the head. Suppose the priors for H p and H d are both 0.45 and the prior for H a is 0.1. Now suppose we get the following evidence E E: The dead man is known to have had severe heart failure.
It is clear in this case that P(E | H p ) = P(E | H d ) and hence the LR of E is 1 with respect to the hypotheses for H p and H d . However, it is also clear that, whatever the value is for P(E | H p ) and P(E | H d ), the value for P(E | H a ) is much higher. The effect of this is that, after observing E, the posterior probabilities of both H p and H d reduce (albeit by the same amount). In particular, P(H p ) drops after observing E. So, even though its LR is equal to one the evidence has clear probative value.
Appendix 6 shows that if P(E | H p ) and P(E | H d ) equal 0.01 and P(E | H a ) is 0.5, then the posterior probability of H p drops from 0.45 to 0.07627
Ensuring hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive can be extremely difficult
It follows from the above that, in order to use the LR to determine the probative value of evidence, the need to select hypotheses that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive is paramount. In practice (we will show this more extensively in Section 5) it is easy to veer towards pairs of hypotheses that are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive. To give an indication of the extent of this problem we refer to the paper [22] which includes an extensive discussion between leading evidence experts about the LR.
On page 8 of [22] Allen introduces an example where, for a pair of prosecution/defence hypotheses he shows that a piece of evidence has LR equal to 1, but he claims the evidence is clearly probative (favours the prosecution) and admissible. He finds this puzzling and feels it exposes some problems with the LR and Bayesian reasoning. Various experts (including those who write extensively about Bayes' theorem) subsequently weigh into the debate with complex philosophical arguments and explanations, and reasons why Bayes and the LR cannot be used etc. But not one of them identifies that Allen's example is fundamentally flawed because it is based on a pair of hypotheses that are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive 5 . Allen's example is of a defendant accused of murder committed in a small town. The evidence E is that the defendant was seen driving to town shortly before the murder was committed. The 'prosecution' and 'defence' hypotheses are respectively:  H p : "Defendant drove to town to commit murder"  H d : "Defendant drove to town to visit his mother who lives there" These are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive because it is possible that both H p and H d could be true and also that both could be false.
Hence, none of the evidence experts in [22] appears to have grasped the implications explained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2: That unless the hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive the LR tells us nothing about the probative value of the evidence and that an LR of 1 certainly does not mean 'no probative value'. All that somebody had to point out to Allen was that -by the most simple application of Bayes theorem -an LR of 1 did not mean in this case that the evidence was not probative. End of discussion. We highlight this case to point out how easy it is to make the mistakes we describe above: If even the world's leading evidence experts can fail to notice nonmutually exclusive hypotheses, it is something the legal community must pay attention to. It cannot be dismissed as yet another 'obvious' or 'trivial' fact because clearly it is easily overlooked.
In fact Allen's hypotheses mix up the evidence ("seen driving to town") with the ultimate hypothesis ("committed murder"). The only natural way to model it -and to show that Allen's example is not a paradox at all -is to use the causal model (this is an example of a Bayesian network) shown in Figure 1 in which we have a Boolean node "Committed murder" (whose true and false states represent the offence level hypotheses), a separate Boolean node "Visited mother" (whose true and false states represent the source level hypotheses introduced by the defence) and a separate evidence node E "seen driving to town". In the model we use as priors Allen's assumptions that P(E | Murder) = P(E | visited mother) (we set each of these to be equal to 0.7 although the values chosen do not affect the overall argument that follows) and for simplicity we assume 'ignorant prior' assumptions for the two pairs of hypotheses (this choice also does not affect the following argument).
Allen is wrong to conclude from the assumption that P(E | Murder) = P(E | visited mother) that the LR of the evidence with respect to the prosecution hypothesis is 1. Instead of comparing P(E | Murder) to P(E | visited mother) as he does we have to compare it to P(E | not Murder).
In fact, while P(E | Murder) = 0.7, it turns out that P(E | not Murder) = 0.4 so the LR is not 1 but rather favours the prosecution hypothesis of 'Murder' being true.
When we perfom the Bayes theorem calculations for this model after observing E (i.e. E is set to 'true') we get the result shown in Figure 2 . So Allen is correct in his intuition that E supports the prosecution hypothesis because P(Murder | E) is greater than P(Murder). The fact that it ALSO supports the defence hypothesis (with the same increase in probability) simply confirms what is written in Section 3.1 above (i.e. is a consequence of non mutually exclusive hypotheses).
The only way to really avoid Allen's 'problem' without introducing more than a single pair of hypotheses is to have very explicit hypotheses that are genuinely mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses, namely:
H: "(defendant committed murder) AND (defendant did not visit mother)" But the problem with such unnatural hypotheses is that it no longer seems either reasonable or feasible to assert that P(E | H) = H(E | not H) in this case (if it were then the evidence really would be neutral).
The problem with neglecting the impact of evidence on offence-level hypotheses
We now consider the case where we have mutually exclusive and exhaustive sourcelevel hypotheses, and evidence that has a LR of one, but which still has probative value for the (very closely related but different) offence-level hypotheses (which are also mutually exclusive and exhaustive).
Example 3: Suppose two men, Fred and Joe live at the same address. It is known that gun X is registered to that address (but not who the owner is). A man, Bob, is found murdered from a gun shot. Shortly after the murder the police find the following evidence E: there is a gun in Fred's house with FDR that matched that from the crime scene. Fred is charged with the murder of Bob. The offence level hypotheses are:
H p : Fred fired the shot that killed Bob H d : Fred did not fire the shot that killed Bob However, at the trial, instead of focusing on the offence-level hypotheses, the lawyers and experts focus on the question of who owned the gun, which they assume is directly related to the question of guilt. Specifically, they consider:
H1 p : Fred owned the gun that killed Bob H1 d : Fred did not own the gun that killed Bob These source-level hypotheses are mutually exclusive and exhaustive and so there is no possibility of making any of the errors highlighted in Section 3. The defence lawyer reasons that, because the gun is equally likely to be owned by Fred or his housemate Joe the probability of the evidence E given H1 p is the same as the probability of the evidence E given H1 d . Hence, the LR of the evidence is one and he concludes correctly that the evidence is neutral with respect to the hypotheses H1 d and H1 p . He therefore insists that it has no probabitive value as it supports neither the prosecution nor defence case.
In fact, we can show (using reasonable assumptions) that while the evidence E is indeed neutral with respect to the source-level hypotheses H1 p and H1 d (if we assume as the lawyer did that the gun is equally likely to be owned by Fred or Joe) it is not neutral with respect to the offence-level hypotheses.
Consider the following assumptions: suppose that before the evidence, there was a 1/100 chance that Fred fired the shot that killed Bob (this is the prior value of H p ); the chance of finding the evidence, E, is higher if Fred did fire the shot that killed Bob, 1/10, vs. if he did not fire the shot, 1/100; Fred is just as likely to have fired the shot that killed Bob whether he owns the gun or not. Under these assumptions, the Bayesian analysis (see Appendix 6, which uses the Bayesian Network model in Figure  3) shows that, while the posterior probability of the source-level prosecution hypothesis H1 p remains unchanged (from a prior of at 1.09%) after we enter the evidence E as true, the offence level prosecution hypothesis H p changes from the prior of 1% to 9.1%. Thus the evidence that was 'neutral' with respect to whether Fred owned the gun has real probative value towards the ultimate hypothesis of Fred's guilt. It follows from the above discussion that the LR of any piece of evidence should be calculated against the offence level hypotheses. However, if (as is usual) the LR determined by forensic experts was calculated for source level hypotheses, then this will involve non-trivial calculations that take account of the causal relationships between offence level and source level hypotheses. Fortunately, Bayesian networks enable us to perform the necessary calculations.
However, there is one additional problem that should be noted: in many situations even the offence level hypotheses "guilty or not guilty" may actually hide implict assumptions that suggest the hypotheses are not exhaustive (so that we are back in the situation described in Section 3.2). An example would be where there is an implict assumption that a crime has actually taken place (for example, a murder) even though there is a small probability (ignored by both sides) that the victim was not actually murdered. In such a situation the 'offence level' hypotheses H p ("guilty") and H d ("not guilty") are wrongly assumed to be exhaustive because what they actually mean are "murder was committed by the defendant" and "murder was committed by somebody other than the defendant" respectively. What is missing is the hypothesis H n "no crime committed". Now suppose we have the evidence E: "victim left a suicide note".
Then clearly P(E | H p ) = P(E | H d ) since the probability of finding a suicide note would not be changed by knowing the identity of the person charged with murder. It follows that the LR is equal to one for the 'offense level' hypotheses, and so this piece of evidence would be (erroneously) regarded as having no probative value. But while it has no impact on H p and H d when the probability of H n is assumed to be zero ( Figure 4 , Case A), it certainly does have an impact when the probability H n is not zero (Figure 4 , Case B where we assume a 1% probability).
14 Case A: when probability of 'no crime committed' is ignored Case B: when probability of 'no crime committed' is not ignored (we assume small probability 1%) (A1) Prior probabilities (B1) Prior probabilities (A2) Posterior probabilities when suicide node evidence found: No change in probability of guilt (B2) Posterior probabilities when suicide node evidence found: increase in probability of no crime resulting in decrease in probability defendant guilty of murder Figure 4 The importance of considering the correct offence level hypotheses.
In both cases we make the same assumptions about P(E | H p ), P(E | H d ), P(E | H n ). Specifically, that P(E | H p ) = P(E | H d ) = 0.01 and P(E | H n ) = 0.1. The actual values do not matter. All that matters is that P(E | H p ) = P(E | H d ) are equal and that P(E | H n ) is greater.
An alternative way to consider this problem is to separate out the pair of offence-level hypotheses "guilty/not guilty" from the ultimate hypotheses "crime committed/crime not committed". This is shown in Figure 5 .
Case A: when probability of 'no crime committed' is ignored Case B: when probability of 'no crime committed' is not ignored (we assume small probability 1%) (A1) Prior probabilities (B1) Prior probabilities (A2) Posterior probabilities when suicide node evidence found: No change in probability of guilt (B2) Posterior probabilities when suicide node evidence found: increase in probability of no crime resulting in decrease in probability of guilty Figure 5 Separating out the pair of offence level hypotheses from the ultimate hypotheses.
Implications for Barry George case
The scenarios above show that evidence with a LR of one can still have significant probative value if the hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and even if they are the evidence may still have significant probative value on the offence-level hypotheses. This has implications for the high profile case of Barry George, which centred around a piece of evidence that was later dismissed for having no probative value based on the fact that it had a LR of one. We first provide a brief overview of the case. We then explain how the transcripts from the judgment of the Case Appeal [1] show how discussions of LRs can easily drift into examples where the simple interpretation of the LR was ill-formed and confused. We emphasize that the confusions we point out are based on the Case Appeal judgment text alone, and we do not make any claims about how these corresponded to the actual arguments made during the appeal trial. Indeed, it is impossible to know how many of the confusions we describe below can be attributed to actual confusions made during the appeal versus confusions during the writing of the judgment document. 6 Nevertheless, the muddled state of the Case Appeal judgment document itself is evidence that LR arguments are easily confused in such a way that simple interpretations of the LR are not warranted. In particular: the document shows hypotheses (for which likelihoods are reported) that are ill-defined, and appear to drift over the course of the case; the precise definition of the evidence for which likelihoods are reported also appear to change over the course of the case; the relationship among the multiple hypotheses being considered, and their relationship to the ultimate hypotheses, are unclear; causal explanations are muddled with diagnostic reasoning, which may result in a confused interpretation of the statistics provided by expert witnesses.
Summary of the Case and the Appeal
In 2001 Barry George (BG) was convicted of the murder of TV celebrity Jill Dando (JD), who had been shot dead in 1999. An important part of the prosecution case centred on the following piece of evidence E: E: A single particle of firearm discharge residue (FDR) -which matched the constituent elements of FDR found at the crime scene -was found one year later in Barry George's coat pocket.
The prosecution expert witnesses (Mr Keeley and Dr Renshaw) asserted that it was not unusual for there to be just one particle found on the person firing the gun. The defence expert Dr Lloyd argued that the small size of the particle 'cast doubts on where it came from' -that it could be the result of contamination, including flawed police procedures. However, in [1] we see that Consequently, analysis of the evidence had concentrated on the possibility that a particle would have got into the pocket as a result of indirect contamination on a number of identified occasions on which this might have occurred. The prosecution case had been that on each such occasion 'this was so unlikely that it could be discounted' [1] . Although no explicit probabilities were mentioned during the trial it is fair to conclude that this meant that there was a very low probability that the FDR in the coat pocket could have been caused by contamination. Mr George is the man who shot Ms Dando Mr George had nothing to do with the incident.
In our opinion the probability of finding a single particle of discharge residue in Mr George's coat pocket would have been the same, regardless of which of the above propositions was true. The FDR evidence is thus inconclusive. In our opinion it provides no assistance to anyone asked to judge which proposition is true."
In 2007 Barry George was granted an appeal solely on the grounds that the FDR evidence, which was relied on by the prosecution at the trial as of great significance, was, in reality, 'neutral', i.e. of no probative value. The Appeal was successful with the judge concluding:
"It is impossible to know what weight, if any, the jury attached to the FDR evidence. It is equally impossible to know what verdict they would have reached had they been told as we were told, by the witnesses who gave evidence before us, that it was just as likely that the single particle of FDR came from some extraneous source as it was that it came from a gun fired by the appellant. The verdict is unsafe. The conviction will be quashed." In what follows we shall assume, as Evett did, that:
Confusions in the Appeal judgment transcript
H p is the hypothesis: "BG was the man who shot JD" E is the evidence: "A single particle of FDR matching that from the gun that killed JD is found in BG coat pocket" It was necessary to balance the likelihood that the particle came from a gun fired by the appellant and the likelihood that it came from some other source. Both were unlikely but both were possible. He did not and could not say that one was more likely than the other. In these circumstances the presence of the particle provided no support for the proposition that the wearer of the coat had fired a gun.
Problems concerning the basic hypotheses
This statement suggests that Keely's prosecution hypothesis was not the H p first stated above (that BG shot JD) but rather:
H1 p : "The particle found in BG's pocket came from a gun fired by BG".
Unfortunately, this hypothesis does not fit with the original LR narrative presented, because, in contrast to the original prosecution likelihood value of 1/100 given by Keely, now the likelihood of the evidence under this new prosecution hypothesis, P(E | H1 p ), must logically be equal to one (this is because the hypothesis that the particle in BG's pocket came from a gun fired by BG entails the evidence E).
Later, in Paragraph 38 we find 7 :
A single particle of FDR had been found in the pocket of the appellant's coat. According to the evidence that Mr Keeley gave to us, this was an equally unlikely event, whether it had come from the cartridge that killed Miss Dando, or from some innocent source. There was an even chance that it had resulted from innocent contamination.
This statement suggests that Keely was assuming yet another different prosecution hypothesis:
H2 p : "The particle found in BG's pocket came from the gun that killed JD".
This possibility is again illogical for the same reason as that in Paragraph 26 above, namely that P(E | H2 p ) must be equal to one and thus Keeley cannot have been thinking of H2 p when he reported a prosecution likelihood of 1/100. However, it does give a very clear indication of what Keeley and the other experts and lawyers might have really meant as the defence hypothesis. Here (and in many other places) the suggestion is that the real alternative cause of the evidence E is a defence hypothesis H2 d that refers to some form of "innocent contamination." By explicitly talking about contamination as an alternative cause of E, Paragraph 38 indicates that Keeley did not use "not H p ", i.e. "BG was not the man who shot JD", as the defence hypothesis. In fact it is highly unlikely that any expert could possibly have provided a realistic direct estimate for the probability P(E | not H p ). And the indications are clear that the experts did not attempt to make such an estimate here. Instead, the experts seem to have considered a different but ill-defined defence hypothesis, namely that there were some circumstances that could have led to the FDR particle being inserted into BG's pocket by contamination. So what was the defence hypothesis being considered, which we refer to as H1 d ? As for H1 p and H2 p above, it makes no sense to define H1 d as "Particle inserted by contamination" because in that case P(E | H1 d ) is again, trivially equal to one and is not 1/100, as reported by Keeley. Instead, we can consider H1 d as representing the set of conditions under which subsequent contamination may be possible. Paragraph 44 of [1] uses the notion of the "integrity of BG's coat being corrupted". We contend that Keeley must therefore have been using a defence hypothesis equivalent to:
H1 d : "Integrity of BG coat was corrupted"
When Keeley -and indeed others -referred to the equal likelihoods it seems reasonable to assume that they were referring to P(E | H p ) and P(E| H1 d ). The problem is that H p ("BG was the man who shot JD") and H1 d "Integrity of BG coat was corrupted") are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that BG was the man who shot JD, but that the FDR particle in his pocket was unrelated to the gun, namely the result of contamination from the integrity of the coat being corrupted. In other words both H p and H1 d may be true (no matter how unlikely they may be jointly). Calculations in Appendix 8, using the BN structure of Figure 6 and the assumptions in the caseshow that it is possible that P(E | H p ) = P(E | H1 
Problems concerning the formulation of the evidence
A further problem with the Barry George case is in the formulation of the evidence. There are actually two separate pieces of evidence that make up E, namely:
E1: a single particle of FDR is found in BG coat pocket E2: the single particle found matches that from the gun that killed JD
The failure especially to distinguish between E1 and E is a fundamental concern throughout the appeal judgment. Consider, for example the crucial FSS summarising statement (Paragraph 22):
"In our opinion, it would be just as likely that a single particle of discharge residue would have been recovered from the pocket of BG's coat whether or not he was the person who shot Ms Dando…"
This statement is NOT an assertion that P(E| H p ) = P(E | not H p ) as is clearly assumed. It is actually the assertion that P(E1 | H p ) = P(E1 | not H p ).
Although it is possible to combine the two pieces of evidence E1 and E2 into the single statement E it is clear that doing so has created confusion for both the experts and the lawyers. For example, in Paragraph 17 of [1] we learn that Mr Keeley estimated the likelihood of his finding one or a few particles as 1 in 100 on either proposition.
Ignoring the additional complication of whether finding 'one particle' or 'a few particles' can really be considered the same, Keeley's assertion is interpreted as meaning P(E | H p ) = P(E | H d ) = 0.01. However, elsewhere the focus of E is not on the 'unusualness' of the single particle finding, but rather on the extent to which finding a particle that 'matches' the ammunition fired by a particular gun actually means the particle came from that ammunition. In standard forensic terminology this would be called the 'random match probability' -the probability that you would find a particle matching some ammunition given that it comes from different ammunition, i.e.
P(E2 | not H2 p )
where H2 p is, as defined above, 'The particle found in BG's pocket is from the gun that killed JD'.
(note the key difference between H2 p and the hypothesis H1 p that Keeley may have unwittingly considered, namely that "The particle found in BG's pocket came from a gun fired by BG").
It is crucial to note that the likelihood P(E2 | not H2 p ) was certainly non-zero, as confirmed by the FSS statement (Paragraph 22) which asserted "The particle is indistinguishable from some of those produced by the round of ammunition used to shoot Ms Dando, but a high proportion can produce such particles.
It is a significant weakness of the arguments in the appeal judgment transcript that this point was not explored elsewhere and that nowhere is any estimate of P(E2 | not H2 p ) provided. However, the transcript suggests that, when Keeley provided a figure of 0. If we were to properly incorporate the distinction between E1 and E2, along with H2 p , we would need the kind of causal model (represented as a Bayesian network) shown in Figure 3 . 
Failure to properly incorporate the notion of 'absence of evidence'
There is great confusion throughout the appeal judgment transcript about the fact that a single particle was found rather than a large collection. There are suggestions in the transcript that finding only a 'small number of particles' -which can actually mean up to 20 -is more likely to result from contamination than the actual firing of a gun.
There is no discussion of the different likelihoods for different numbers of particles, presumably on the assumption that this would be redundant for any number other than one (one being the number in E). While the latter would certainly be unnecessary there is, however, one important additional piece of evidence (which surely favours the defence) whose likelihood should have been considered:
E3: failure to find particles elsewhere in BG's apartment or possessions.
While this introduces significant extra complexity into the model (which would therefore be more complex than that in Appendix 9) the concern is that E3 may actually have been consciously or unconsciously 'factored' in to the evidence E when the likelihoods of E were estimated. In other words the experts may have been considering likelihoods like P(E1 and E2 and E3 | H p ) and if so it would have been difficult to do so consistently.
Failure to properly identify multiple different hypotheses and their relationships
Most of the above problems and confusions would have been avoided by a clearly stated set of hypotheses and evidence so that every explicit (or implicit) statement of conditional probability could have been clearly stated as P(A | B) where A and B were unambiguous.
But the problems go much deeper because it is clear that there are many different hypotheses being considered in the evidence (and often these are being confused) and that it is inconceivable that the experts could have provided all of the appropriate likelihoods to come to the conclusions that they did. Here are examples of just some of the distinct pairs of prosecution and defence hypotheses that are mentioned in the Appeal ruling (including ones mentioned above) [ That there must be far more hypotheses involved is evident from the fact that numerous probabilistic and quasi-probabilistic statements mentioned in the trial are not encapsulated by the grossly simple original H p , H d and E alone [1] . For example:
1. Para 9:
"In Mr Keeley's experience FDR would more often than not be found on the firer of the gun, but would not be found on ordinary members of the public unless they had been associated with firearms."
Para 22:
"In our opinion, it would be just as likely that a single particle of discharge residue would have been recovered from the pocket of Mr George's coat whether or not he was the person who shot Ms Dando nearly a year previously."
Para 23:
"Mr George is the man who shot Ms Dando Mr George had nothing to do with the incident." "In our opinion the probability of finding a single particle of discharge residue in Mr George's coat pocket would have been the same, regardless of which of the above propositions was true."
Para 26:
"It was necessary to balance the likelihood that the particle came from a gun fired by the appellant and the likelihood that it came from some other source. Both were unlikely but both were possible. He did not and could not say that one was more likely than the other. In these circumstances the presence of the particle provided no support for the proposition that the wearer of the coat had fired a gun."
Para 27:
"Mr Keeley said that he had intended to convey to the jury that it was no more likely that the single particle of FDR came from a gun fired at the time of Miss Dando's murder than that it came from some other source."
6. Para 28:
"Dr Renshaw s (who had also given evidence at the trial) evidence accorded with that of Mr Keeley. While it was unlikely that the particle had resulted from secondary contamination of the coat it was equally unlikely that it was the result of the appellant firing a gun a year before." 25 7. Para 29:
"The evidence had concentrated on the possibility that a particle would have got into the pocket as a result of indirect contamination on a number of identified occasions on which this might have occurred. The prosecution case had been that on each such occasion this was so unlikely that it could be discounted."
8. Para 37:
"The remainder of Mr Keeley's evidence was devoted to consideration of the likelihood of secondary contamination. He was taken in detail through each occasion on which the defence suggested that there might have been a possibility of such contamination and gave his opinion in respect of each instance that contamination was 'most unlikely" 9. Para 38:
"A single particle of FDR had been found in the pocket of the appellant's coat. According to the evidence that Mr Keeley gave to us, this was an equally unlikely event, whether it had come from the cartridge that killed Miss Dando, or from some innocent source. There was even chance that it had resulted from innocent contamination."
Para 44:
"I am not going to attempt a statistical probability of this happening by reason of innocent contamination. We submit that it is so unlikely that you can safely ignore the possibility of innocent contamination."
Problem of replacing causal explanations with purely diagnostic reasoning
Finally, to make matters even more confusing there appears to have been confusion about the entire notion of conditional probability that makes the use of the LR irrelevant. Specifically, much of the discussion is couched not in terms of a natural causal model (whereby the truth or otherwise of a hypothesis leads to certain types of evidence being more or less likely to be observed) but rather a purely diagnostic model in which the experts consider explicitly which of the alternative hypotheses most naturally explains the observed evidence. (For example, see Paragraphs 26 and 38 above from [1] .) This difference is summarised inFigure 4. Specifically, much discussion focuses on whether the evidence E of the discovery of a single particle of FDR in the coat is more likely to imply H2 p ("Particle found in pocket is from gun that killed JD") or not H2 p
That the unnatural diagnostic model seems to have been unwittingly used is evident from the fact that in this case it make no sense to elicit from experts P(E | H2 p ) and P(E | not H2 p ) because in both cases the probabilities are equal to one. Instead we have to consider P(H2 p | E) and P(not H2 p | E). Much of what is contained in the transcript indicates that at least some of the experts and lawyers involved were assuming that it was P(H2 p | E) = P(not H2 p | E) = 0.01. If we assume this then it is true that the evidence has no probative value on H2 p but that does not mean the evidence has no probative value on Hp.
Conclusions and recommendations
Justice is best served when the evidence and hypotheses under consideration are accessible and clear to all parties and are unambiguously defined. In particular, this is the only way to assign correct meanings to the likelihoods provided by expert witnesses. Furthermore, because the probabitive value of a piece of evidence on source-level hypotheses may be very different from its probabitive value on offencelevel hypotheses, the relationships between source-level and offence-level hypotheses must be made clear. We have demonstrated that an an efficient way to achieve such clarity will require the construction of causal models through the aid of tools such as Bayesian networks. This approach helps to improve legal reasoning and by doing so demonstrates how hypotheses can be clarified, related and made precise enough for reliable quantificiation.
We have demonstrated serious concerns about the Barry George Appeal Court judgment. The case document suffered from oversimplification: what appeared as a superficially simple set of hypotheses were actually a set of ill-defined, but related, assumptions and vaguely defined hypotheses. Under these circumstances the 'simple LR rule' inadequately captured the probative value of the evidence. We have shown that evidence with an LR equal to one in this case was not necessarily 'neutral' but, rather, still favoured the prosecution as assumed in the original trial.
We contend that, in order to determine whether evidence has probative value -and therefore whether it should be excluded from proceedings or not -it should be evaluated against offence-level hypotheses. Any diversion from this key principle will carry the risk that evidence might be presented to the jury merely as a diversionary tactic, and persuade it to make decisions based on superfluous source-level hypotheses. The errors we highlight are taken from a judgment document, and although this may not always have accurately recorded what was said in court, the fact that it contains so much erroneous reasoning is cause for concern. Clearly if a case judgment can be wraught with so many failings, similar problems are likely to occur in courtroom judgments too. Additionally, it is a concern that the careful and rigorous presentations of statistical evidence made by conscientious expert witnesses can become distorted in a case judgment.
Buried among the numerous muddled arguments present throughout the Barry George Appeal transcript, there is a lucid statement that captures a key point we have made in this paper: "It is often the case that a piece of evidence that proves nothing when viewed in isolation acquires probative value when considered in the context of other evidence." (Paragraph 33) [1] . Thus, the voice of correct reasoning was present, but it was outnumbered by the numerous imprecise and incorrect arguments scattered throughout the Appeal judgment document. In this paper we have provided formal and clear explanations in order to illuminate the above point. We present this work with the hope that in the future, such voices of correct reasoning will not be drowned out by erroneous arguments. The following is an example of how likelihood ratio describes the impact of evidence on a pair of mutually exclusive hypotheses:
Appendix Example 1: Suppose that a man is charged with a gambling offence, namely that he was using a 'fixed' die in which five of the six sides were 6's. Let H p be the hypothesis that the die was fixed, and let H d be the alternative hypothesis that the die was not fixed (i.e. it was a 'fair' die). The evidence E is the observation that the outcome of two consecutive rolls of the die were two 6s. Then
In this case the prosecution likelihood is 25 times greater than the defence likelihood, i.e. the LR is 25. In the above example, the fact that the prosecution likelihood is 25 times greater than the defence likelihood suggests intuitively that the evidence E supports the prosecution hypothesis. In fact, it can be proven that when prosecution and defence hypotheses are mutually exclusive, a LR of greater than one supports the prosecution hypothesis and a LR of less than one supports the defence hypothesis. Hence, the LR has a simple interpretation for the probative value of the evidence under these assumptions, and the proof is as follows:
In order to prove this important property of the LR, we need Bayes' theorem Bayes' Theorem tells us that:
P E H P H P H E PE 
By applying Bayes' theorem to both H p and H d we get the equivalent form of Bayes (called the 'odds' version): The term
represents the revised 'posterior odds' -the relative (posterior) belief in the prosecution hypothesis over the defence hypothesis having observed the evidence E. Most texts that attempt to explain the impact of the LR on the probative value of E use an argument based on the relative 'odds' of the hypotheses. The formula tells us that whatever our prior odds were in favour of the prosecution hypothesis, the posterior odds are the result of multiplying the prior odds by the LR. Hence, when the prosecution likelihood is greater than the defence likelihood the posterior odds in favour of the prosecution hypothesis must increase.
However, this argument it is unnecessarily confusing, because not only does it hide the assumption that the hypotheses need to be mutually exclusive for it to work, but it also fails to tell us clearly what we most need to know: namely that for the evidence E to 'support' the hypothesis H p it is necessary that the posterior probability of H p , i.e. P(H p |E) is greater than the prior probability P(H p ) in other words our belief in H p being true increases after we observe E.
What follows is a proof that P(H p |E) > P(H p ) when the LR is greater than 1:
But since the LR>1 it follows that:
Hence, substituting these into the above inequality equation we get:
Appendix 2. Neutral evidence
First we prove that evidence E is neutral when the LR is 1 and when the prosecution and defence hypotheses are mutually exclusive.
Since the LR is 1 we know that P( Now we can also use marginalisation to compute ( ) : 
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Next we add the motive evidence. Because this scenario involves four related variables the Bayesian calculations are rather too complex to demonstrate from scratch and so we use a Bayesian network software tool.
For this the Bayesian calculations are too tricky to carry out by hand, so we use a Bayesian network tool. Figure 9 shows the prior probabilities. Figure 10 shows the results of observing the motive evidence E'. In this case P(H p | E') = 0.875, while P(H d | E') is unchanged at 0.5. When we now observe E (Figure 11 ) we see that the probability of H p , that is P(H p |E', E), jumps to 0.933. The evidence E therefore may be sufficient in this case to convince a jury to convict (if there were, say a threshold of 90% certainty required). These posterior values can be arrived at as follows: 
Figure 14 BN in Example 3
Here the secondary hypothesis H1 p of whether Fred owned the gun is a parent of the ultimate hypothesis H p . This is a classic example of an 'opportunity' node [26] . For our current analysis we assume that Fred will be equally likely to have fired the gun regardless of whether he owned it (i.e., chance that Fred fired the gun does not depend on whether he owned it). We assume that, before the evidence, the prior probability that Fred fired the gun is 1/00. This gives us the conditional probability table for P(H p | H) shown in Figure 15 : The table shows that Fred is just as likely to use the gun whether he owns it or not (thus the link between H1 p and H p is actually redundant). Now we need the conditional probability table for the evidence given the two sets of hypotheses, P(E | H p , H1 p ). This is shown in Figure 16 use Here we again made the reasonable assumption that if Fred fired the gun it is just as likely E will be true whether or not he owned it and this likelihood is 1/10. Similarly if he did not fire the gun it is just as likely the evidence would be observed (E=true) whether or not he owned the gun, but in the case these equal probabilities are lower (1/100) than in the case if he did fire the gun.
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The prior state of the model with the above conditional probability tables is shown in Figure 17 
Figure 17 Prior state of the BN
Now we use the BN to calculate the probability of evidence E under the two values for H1 p , which means setting the node for 'Fred owned the gun' to True and False respectively. The screen shots from the BN calculation ( Figure 18 ) show that the likelihoods P(E|H1 p ) and P(E|not H1 p ) are equal and hence the LR with respect to H1 p is 1. When we observe the evidence (set E=true) we get the result shown in Figure 19 .
P(E |
H1
Figure 19 Evidence is observed
We see that the evidence has not changed H1 p , i.s. P(H1 p | E) = P(H1 p ) = 50%, and thus the evidence is 'neutral' with respect to whether Fred owned the gun. However, P(H p |E ) is not equal to H p -the probability has increased from 1% to 9.17%. Thus, the evidence is not neutral with respect to the ultimate hypothesis: the evidence increases the chance of Fred being guilty of murder.
P(E| H p ) = P(E |H1 d ) = 0.015, as shown in Figure 21 , which confirms that the likelihoods are equal as assumed by Keeley and Evett. However, this certainly does not mean the evidence E is neutral because, as shown Figure The more realistic causal model incorporating appropriate hypotheses and evidence is shown in Figure 22 .
Figure 22 More realistic BN model
Completing the conditional probabilities (likelihoods) for this revised model involves eliciting several more probabilities than were discussed at the trial. This would actually be helpful to all concerned -the required probabilities are not ambiguous like the original ones. Without knowing what these probabilities are, we have simply entered values that are most favourable to the defence case. Nevertheless the posterior probability of H p given E1 and E2 still increases as shown in Figure 23 . 
